Epistemology

The Possibility of Knowledge

If nothing can be known for certain, should we say so and follow whatever seems most convincing, or refuse even to say that and suspend judgment on everything?

Positions

  1. Academic Fallibilism

    Nothing can be apprehended with certainty, but some impressions are more persuasive than others, and those that hold up under careful checking may guide inquiry and action without being accepted as true.

    Against the Stoic claim that action requires cognitive impressions, this position allows inquiry and action to follow critically examined persuasive impressions without treating them as certain knowledge.

    Held by Academic Skepticism

  2. Pyrrhonian Suspension

    For every claim an equally strong opposing claim can be found, so one should suspend judgment (epoché) on all matters beyond how things appear.

    Held by Pyrrhonism

Methods used to investigate this question

  • Academic Dialectic

    Academic dialectic investigates a question by arguing on opposing sides or by drawing consequences from an interlocutor's own commitments. The questioner can expose a contradiction without accepting the premises or conclusion as a position of their own.

    Open in Methods

  • Pyrrhonian Opposition of Arguments

    Pyrrhonian suspension sets opposing appearances or arguments against one another and withholds assent when neither side is more convincing.

    Open in Methods

Discussion

Ancient skeptics split over what follows once certainty is out of reach. The Pyrrhonist finds the arguments on every question evenly balanced and so suspends judgment, living by appearances without belief and without concluding that knowledge is impossible, since that would be one more dogma. The Academic answer is the one Carneades developed: nothing can be grasped with certainty, yet impressions differ in how persuasive they are, so the reasonable person may follow the most persuasive without treating it as knowledge. Arcesilaus, the earlier Academic, had instead suspended judgment about everything.

The dispute is at one scope, what to do when certainty is unavailable, so the two answers are genuine rivals: the Academic asserts that nothing can be apprehended and grades impressions by persuasiveness, while the Pyrrhonist asserts nothing and suspends across the board. Skepticism aimed narrowly at whether a mind-independent world can be known is a distinct question, treated under Knowledge of the External World.

References