Position
Academic Fallibilism
Nothing can be apprehended with certainty, but some impressions are more persuasive than others, and those that hold up under careful checking may guide inquiry and action without being accepted as true.
Classification
- Position level
- specific
- Domains
- Epistemology
Overview
Carneades developed a graded standard short of certainty: impressions differ in how persuasive they are, and stronger impressions withstand comparison and examination. This supplies a basis for deliberate action without a Stoic cognitive impression. On Clitomachus's report the sage follows the persuasive without assenting to its truth; on the reading Sextus attacks, the Academics assent to it, which is why he keeps the two schools apart. Whether Carneades endorsed the standard or proposed it only to answer the Stoic objection is disputed.
Position on
- The Possibility of Knowledge
Against the Stoic claim that action requires cognitive impressions, this position allows inquiry and action to follow critically examined persuasive impressions without treating them as certain knowledge.
Held by traditions
- Academic Skepticism
Carneades developed the persuasive-impression criterion in reply to Stoic objections that skepticism made action impossible. Whether he endorsed it as his own doctrine or advanced it dialectically remains disputed.
Question scope: The Possibility of Knowledge
Broader position
Rival positions
- Pyrrhonian Suspension
Question scope: The Possibility of Knowledge
References
- Cicero, Academica II.59, 99, 108 (acting by persuasive impressions without assent)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Carneades, §2.2 'Probabilism' (the persuasive impression, and the dispute over Carneades' own commitments)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Carneades, §2.2 'Probabilism'
- Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.226 (the Academics assert that everything is inapprehensible)
- Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.226–231, which separates the two schools on two points: the Academics assert that everything is inapprehensible and give persuasive impressions a strong inclination, while the Pyrrhonist asserts neither and suspends across the board
- Cicero, Academica II.99–108 (the Academic sage follows the persuasive without assenting to its truth)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ancient Skepticism