Philosophy of Mind

Existence of the Self

Is there an enduring, substantial self at all, or only a stream of changing states?

Positions

  1. Bundle Theory

    There is no persisting self, only a bundle of ever-changing perceptions; what we call personal identity is a fiction the mind ascribes to them on the basis of resemblance and succession.

  2. No-Self

    There is no enduring, substantial self.

    Held by Buddhism, Zen (Chan)

  3. Substantial Self

    The self is a simple, persisting thinking substance.

    Held by Continental Rationalism

Engaged by schools of thought

  • Vedanta

    Against no-self views, Vedānta affirms a real, enduring self (ātman) established by the Upaniṣads; its schools then differ on the self's relation to brahman — strict identity in Advaita, distinct-yet-dependent in Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita.

Methods used to investigate this question

  • Nididhyāsana

    Nididhyāsana is sustained Vedāntic contemplation that assimilates a teaching about self and brahman after it has been heard and examined through reasoning.

    Open in Methods

  • Prasaṅga

    Prasaṅga examines a thesis by drawing out consequences of its own assumptions, often without replacing it with an independent metaphysical counter-thesis.

    Open in Methods

  • Upaniṣadic Contemplation

    Upaniṣadic contemplation joins receptive study, reflective reasoning, and sustained contemplation in an inquiry into self and ultimate reality.

    Open in Methods

  • Yogic Concentration

    Yogic concentration progressively stills mental activity by binding attention to a single object, sustaining that attention, and letting it deepen into absorption.

    Open in Methods

  • Zazen

    Zazen is seated Zen practice that coordinates posture, breathing, and attention to transform habitual, self-centered ways of experiencing.

    Open in Methods

Discussion

Before asking what makes a self persist, one can ask whether there is any enduring self to persist. Substance views hold that a single subject underlies a life; reductive and no-self views deny it, treating "the self" as a convenient name for a bundle or stream of impersonal states with no owner behind them.

Answering this shapes but does not settle the persistence question: someone who denies an enduring self still owes an account of why experience hangs together as if it belonged to one person, which the map treats separately under Persistence of the Self.

References