Metaphysics

The Problem of Universals

Are there real universals, such as the redness that many red things share, and if so, do they exist apart from the things that have them?

Positions

  1. Moderate Realism

    Universals are real but exist only in things, abstracted by minds.

    Held by Scholasticism

  2. Nominalism

    Only particular things exist; universals are concepts or names, not real entities.

    Held by Medieval Nominalism

  3. Platonic Realism

    Universals are intelligible Forms independent of the changing particulars that participate in them.

    Held by Platonism

Methods used to investigate this question

  • Scholastic Disputation

    Scholastic disputation examines a stated question by presenting objections, authorities, a reasoned determination, and replies to the objections.

    Open in Methods

Discussion

The problem of universals asks why many distinct things can be called by one name or understood under one concept. It comes in two stages: first whether there is any real universal at all, and then, if there is, whether it exists apart from the particulars that have it or only in them. It connects ancient metaphysics, medieval debates, and contemporary work on language and ontology.

References