Consequentialism

Classification

Position level

specific

Domains

Ethics

Overview

Consequentialism locates the whole of an action's moral character downstream of it. Nothing about the act in itself — the kind of thing it is, the rule it follows, the motive behind it — settles whether it was right; what settles it is how the world goes as a result. Its classical form assesses that result impartially, with no one's interests weighing more because they happen to be the agent's own, but consequentialism as such does not require this: agent-relative versions drop impartiality, and rule and satisficing versions relax other features of the classical theory.

That impartiality is both the classical theory's appeal and the source of its standard objections. It explains why distance and personal attachment do not reduce a stranger's claim on us, and it also appears to license any act, however monstrous in itself, whose consequences come out ahead — leaving the agent little room for the projects and loyalties that give a particular life its shape.

Position on

• The Basis of Right Action

Held by traditions

• Mohism

  Mohist consequentialism judges acts and policies by their benefit to the world, counted as wealth, population, and order, rather than by individual happiness.

  Question scope: The Basis of Right Action

• Classical Utilitarianism

  Question scope: The Basis of Right Action

Rival positions

• Kantian Deontology

  Question scope: The Basis of Right Action

• Virtue Ethics

  Question scope: The Basis of Right Action

References

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Consequentialism
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Deontological Ethics, §1 (deontology is defined by denying the consequentialist claim that the right is determined by the good produced)
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Virtue Ethics, §1 (virtue ethics makes character prior to both the good outcome and the rule, so it cannot hold together with a consequentialist account of what makes an act right)