Position
Coherence Theory of Truth
A proposition is true if and only if it coheres with a comprehensive, consistent system of beliefs.
Classification
- Position level
- specific
- Domains
- Epistemology, Metaphysics
Overview
Associated with the British idealists and defended in the twentieth century by Blanshard, the coherence theory denies that truth reaches past our beliefs to a bare fact. What makes a belief true is how completely it hangs together with the rest of an ideally comprehensive system. Critics press the plurality objection: more than one coherent system seems possible, yet they cannot all be true.
Position on
Held by traditions
- British Idealism
Joachim stated it in The Nature of Truth (1906); Bradley is usually counted with him, though one reading credits Bradley with an identity theory of truth instead.
Question scope: The Nature of Truth
Rival positions
- Correspondence Theory of Truth
Question scope: The Nature of Truth
References
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Coherence Theory of Truth
- Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (1939)
- Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (1939), vol. II, ch. 26
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Blanshard's argument: if coherence is the test of truth, truth cannot consist in correspondence)