School of thought

British Idealism

Movement

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Classification

Period
c. 1865-1925 CE
Regions
Europe (origin)
Domains
Epistemology, Metaphysics

Overview

British Idealism is the movement that held that reality as a whole forms a single, all-encompassing rational system — the Absolute — whose character is ultimately mental or spiritual. For a generation it was the dominant academic philosophy in Britain. Josiah Royce developed a closely related absolute idealism in the United States, which this entry treats as a counterpart rather than as part of the British movement. Moore and Russell broke with it around 1900, and that break is where analytic philosophy begins.

Key ideas

  • The Absolute: Reality is a single, all-inclusive, rational whole. Individual things, taken in isolation, are abstractions from that whole.
  • Internal Relations: Relations help constitute the things they relate rather than merely connecting already independent items.
  • Coherence Theory of Truth: Truth is understood through the coherence of beliefs within a comprehensive system.

Key figures

F. H. Bradley · T. H. Green · Bernard Bosanquet · J. M. E. McTaggart

Positions held

  • Absolute Idealism
  • Coherence Theory of Truth

    Joachim stated it in The Nature of Truth (1906); Bradley is usually counted with him, though one reading credits Bradley with an identity theory of truth instead.

    Question scope: The Nature of Truth

Influenced by

  • German Idealism

    Stirling's The Secret of Hegel (1865) opened a sustained British reception of Hegel, from which Green, Bradley and Bosanquet built their own systems of the Absolute.

Later connections

  • Analytic Philosophy Reacted to this tradition

    Moore and Russell rejected the doctrine of internal relations, on which a relation partly constitutes the terms it relates, and the coherence theory of truth that went with it. They argued instead that relations are external to their terms and that a true proposition can be analysed into independently real constituents rather than judged only by its coherence within a system of belief.

References