Position
Leibnizian Substance Pluralism
Reality contains infinitely many simple, unextended substances—monads—and bodies are grounded in them rather than being substances of a second material kind.
Classification
- Position level
- specific
- Domains
- Metaphysics
Overview
A monad has no parts and is a genuine unity. Each unfolds its perceptions from within and represents the universe from its own point of view; familiar bodies are aggregates grounded in these simple substances, not independent material substances.
Position on
Incompatible positions
- Spinozistic Substance Monism
Question scope: How Many Fundamental Substances?
- Substance Dualism
Question scope: How Many Fundamental Substances?
References
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Leibniz’s Philosophy of Mind, §1
- G. W. Leibniz, Monadology, §§1 and 57
- Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, proposition 14 (no substance except God)
- G. W. Leibniz, Monadology, §§1 and 57 (simple substances and their infinite multitude)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Leibniz’s Philosophy of Mind, §1 (Leibniz rejects two kinds of substance and holds that infinitely many unextended substances ground bodies)