Falsificationism

Classification

Position level

specific

Domains

Epistemology , Philosophy of Science

Overview

Popper proposed falsifiability as the criterion that separates genuine science from pseudo-science and metaphysics, replacing the search for confirming instances with a demand for testable, refutable risk. A theory that survives repeated attempts at refutation is corroborated, never proven true.

Position on

• Science and Demarcation

Held by traditions

• Critical Rationalism

  Question scope: Science and Demarcation

Incompatible positions

• Kuhnian Puzzle-Solving

  Question scope: Science and Demarcation

• Progressive Research Programmes

  Question scope: Science and Demarcation

References

• Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), ch. 1
• Thomas S. Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?', in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1970), which argues against Popper that the mark of science is normal puzzle-solving under a paradigm rather than readiness to refute
• Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1970), which argues that no single theory is refuted by observation and relocates the criterion to a programme's record of predicting novel facts