Position

Compatibilism

Free will is compatible with causal determinism: an action is free when it flows from the agent's own reasons, desires, or character, whether or not those are themselves causally determined.

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Classification

Position level
specific
Domains
Ethics, Metaphysics

Overview

The compatibilist denies that the free-will question turns on whether determinism is true. What matters is the source of an action: whether it flows from the agent's own deliberation, desires and character, or from coercion, compulsion or manipulation that bypasses them. A determined action can meet that test; a coerced one cannot, determinism or no determinism.

The recurring objection is that this relocates the problem rather than solving it. If an agent's character and desires were themselves fixed by causes reaching back before their birth, then a manipulated agent and an ordinary one differ in their proximate story but not in any way that looks capable of grounding responsibility.

Position on

Held by traditions

  • Stoicism

    Chrysippus held that every action is fated, yet our assent to what appears to us is up to us, so we are rightly held responsible even though we could not have done otherwise.

    Question scope: Free Will

Rival positions

References