Position
Anthropocentric Moral Standing
Only human beings have direct moral standing; duties concerning nonhuman nature derive from its effects on present or future human interests.
Classification
- Position level
- specific
- Domains
- Ethics, Philosophy of Nature
Overview
This view can support strong environmental protection without treating nonhuman nature as an end in itself. Ecosystems, species, and animals matter because human health, livelihood, culture, and future well-being depend on them.
Kant gives the classic statement: we have no duties to animals, only duties regarding them, which are indirect duties to ourselves — cruelty to animals dulls our natural sympathy and so weakens a disposition that serves morality in our dealings with other people.
Position on
References
- Bryan G. Norton, 'Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism', Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), pp. 131–148
- Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Doctrine of Virtue §§16–17 (Ak 6:442–443)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Environmental Ethics, §1